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Abstract
Scientific coauthorship, generated by collaborations and competitions among researchers, reflects effective
organizations of human resources. Researchers, their expected benefits through collaborations, and their
cooperative costs constitute the elements of a game. Hence we propose a cooperative game model to
explore the evolution mechanisms of scientific coauthorship networks. The model generates geometric
hypergraphs, where the costs are modelled by space distances, and the benefits are expressed by node
reputations, i. e. geometric zones that depend on node position in space and time. Modelled coop-
erative strategies conditioned on positive benefit-minus-cost reflect the spatial reciprocity principle in
collaborations, and generate high clustering and degree assortativity, two typical features of coauthorship
networks. Modelled reputations generate the generalized Poisson parts and fat tails appeared in specific
distributions of empirical data, e. g. paper team size distribution. The combined effect of modelled costs
and reputations reproduces the transitions emerged in degree distribution, in the correlation between
degree and local clustering coefficient, etc. The model provides an example of how individual strategies
induce network complexity, as well as an application of game theory to social affiliation networks.
Introduction
Collaborations between researchers contribute not only to the breakthrough achievement unattainable
by individuals [1, 2], but also to the transmission and fusion of knowledge, and hence they incubate
several interdisciplines [3–6]. Coauthorship in scientific papers, as a valid proxy of collaborations, can
be expressed graphically (termed as coauthorship network), where nodes and edges represent authors
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2and coauthorship respectively. Studies of large-scale coauthorship networks provide a bird-eye view of
collaboration patterns in diverse fields, and have become an important topic of social sciences [7–11].
Empirical coauthorship networks have specific common local (degree assortativity, high clustering) and
global (fat-tail, small-world) features [12–17]. Some important models have been proposed to reproduce
those properties, such as modeling fat-tail through preferential attachment or cumulative advantage [18–
23], modeling degree assortativity by connecting two non-connected nodes that have similar degrees [24].
Except for preferential attachment, the inhomogeneity of node influences is an alternative explanation for
fat-tail: Nodes with wider influences are likely to gain more connections [25]. The idea has been applied
to model coauthorship networks in a geometric way: Node influences are modelled by attaching specific
geometric zones to nodes [26,27].
To find the essence from the above features, we face a basic question [28]: “How did cooperative behav-
ior evolve?” Five typical mechanisms of cooperative evolution [29] all hold for coauthorship: Coauthoring
frequently occurs between students and their tutors (Kin selection); Cooperation helps to achieve break-
throughs that are unattainable by individual (Direct reciprocity); Coauthoring someone could establish
a good reputation (Indirect reciprocity); Spatial structures or social networks make some researchers in-
teract more often than others and obtain more collaborators (Network reciprocity); A successful research
team is attractive for collaborators (Group selection). To quantify collaborations and predict behavioral
outcomes, a modelling approach termed as game theory is developed to find rational strategies. Then do
there exist inherent game rules behind the complexity of coauthorship networks?
We try to find a solution for the above question through simulation. A cooperative game consists of
two elements: a set of players and a characteristic function specifying the value (i. e. benefit-minus-cost)
created by subsets of players in the game. Scientific cooperation has those elements. The diversity of
researchers’ learning programs of leads to their individual research interests. Cooperation costs could
be considered as investments of time and effort to complete a study by crossing the distance between
research interests [30]. The reputation in academic society could be regarded as the expected benefit of
cooperation: Coauthoring with a famous researcher contributes to achieve academic success.
In the model, the set of interests is abstracted as a circle, and players are located on the circle.
Cooperative costs are geometrized as angular distances, and the reputation benefit of a player is valued
as a power function of player generation time. Modelled cooperative strategies conditioned on positive
benefit-minus-cost imitate the spatial reciprocity principle in collaborations [31], and yield high clustering
3and degree assortativity. The designed form of reputations, together with the strategies, yield the features
(hook heads, fat tails [32]) of specific distributions of empirical data, such as degree distribution, the
distribution of paper team sizes, etc. Moreover, the combined effect of spatial reciprocity and the diversity
of reputations reproduce the transition phenomena in degree distribution, in the correlation between
degree and local clustering coefficient, etc. The good model-data fitting shows the reasonability of the
designed game mechanisms.
This paper is organized as follows: The model and data are described in Sections 2 and 3 respectively;
Cooperation cost, reputation benefit and the relationship between them are discussed in Sections 4 and
5 respectively; The conclusion is drawn in Section 6.
The model
Hypergraph is a generalization of graph, in which an edge (termed as hyperedge) can join any number
of nodes. Coauthorship relationship can be expressed by a hypergraph, where nodes represent authors,
and the author group of a paper (called it a “paper team”) forms a hyperedge. A number of models have
been proposed for generating hypergraphs in specific random ways, and some of them have been used for
modelling coauthorship networks [32–34]. Meanwhile, there has been an amount of previous work on the
structures of specific random hypergraphs, such as clustering, the emergence of a giant component, and
so on [35–38].
We provide a geometric hypergraph model, where the set of research interests is abstracted as a circle
S1, and researchers are expressed as nodes located on the circle (Fig. 1). The nodes are generated in
batches from 1 to T ∈ Z+, hence they can be identified by spatio-temporal coordinates. Some nodes are
randomly selected as “lead nodes” to attach specific arcs that imitate their “reputations”. The nodes
covered by a lead node’s arc constitute a “research team”. The paper teams are modelled by hyperedges,
which are generated by following cooperative game mechanism.
A cooperative game consists of two elements: a set of players N and a characteristic function specifying
the value (benefit-minus-cost) created by subsets of players in the game. The characteristic function
is a function v mapping each subset S of N to the value v(S) it creates. Regard nodes as players
N = {i1, ..., in}. Think of player il as a lead node with players il1 , ..., ilm as its research team members,
and player ic as a candidate attempting to cooperate with il and specific members (e. g. il1 , ..., ils).
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Figure 1. An illustration of an evolutionary research team. At each time, a new player joins
the research team, and the group of the players with white numbers forms a hyperedge. It illustrates an
usual scene: A new coming player 6 wants to complete a work and write it as a paper. Suppose
completing the paper needs four players. Then player 6 would ask the leader 1 for help, and the leader
would suggest team members 2 and 3, who have most similar interest to player 6, to cooperate.
Assume that the cooperation cost is d(il, il1 , ..., ils , ic), and suppose that those players will receive a
benefit valued by il’s reputation r(il). We can define an intuitive characteristic function v for this game
as follows:
v(S) =

r(il)− d(il, il1 , ..., ils , ic), S = {il, il1 , ..., ils , ic};
0, S 6= {il, il1 , ..., ils , ic}.
(1)
Under the definition (1), if v({il, il1 , ..., ils , ic}) > 0, those players will collaborate.
The empirical distributions of paper team sizes emerge a hook head and a fat tail, which means the
sizes of substantial papers are around their average, and a few papers have a significantly large size. In
reality, researchers in a small research team are more likely to write papers together. Members of a large
research team rarely coauthor a paper all together, but rather with a fraction of members. Treating paper
team size as a random variable x, we design a mechanism to simulate the distribution of x. Give the
upper bound of small research team µ > 0, and the lower bound of large research team ν > 0. Denote the
expected value of paper team size and the size of corresponding research team to be η and λ respectively.
Let η = λ, if λ ≤ µ; Let η = µ, if µ < λ ≤ ν; Draw η from a power law distribution with an exponent γ
and domain [µ, λ], if λ > ν. Then draw x from a Poisson distribution with expected value η. Note that
in the description of the above game, x = s+ 2 and λ = m+ 2.
Cooperation costs could be considered as investments of time and effort to complete a study by
5crossing the distance between the research interest of the leader and that of the candidate, etc. Denote
the spatio-temporal coordinates of player i ∈ N by (θi, ti), and write the player as i(θi, ti). We abstractly
geometrize the cost d(il, il1 ..., ils , ic) = pi−|pi−|θil −θic ||, namely the angular distance between il(θil , til)
and ic(θic , tic).
We now show how to value reputation. Considering the inefficient information of new players, we
simply assume each lead node has the same attraction to new players and so value the reputation of a lead
node i(θi, ti) as r(i) ∝ 1/ti. Hence the expected number of i’s collaborators ki(t) = α(T − ti)/ti ≈ αT/ti
at time T  ti, where α > 0. Those yield P (ki(T ) < k) = P (ti > αT/k). The probability density of a
lead node generated at ti is 1/T . Hence P (ti > αt/k) = 1 − P (ti 6 αT/k) = 1 − α/k. Then the tail of
degree distribution P (k) = ∂P (ki(T ) < k)/∂k ∝ 1/k2. We can obtain the general case P (k) ∝ 1/k1+1/β
for large enough k by valuing the reputation r(i) = αt−βi t
β−1, where β ∈ (0, 1]. The strict mathematical
deduction of the degree distribution tail needs averaging on Poisson distribution, which is inspired by
some of the same general ideas as explored in Ref. [25].
We next show how to generate a paper team, namely cooperation rule. Empirical collaboration
behaviors have specific certainty (due to kin selection, network selection, etc.), as well as uncertainty.
Consider an usual scene, a researcher i of leader j’s research team wants to complete a work and write
it as a paper, which needs x ≥ 2 researchers to work together. Then i would ask the leader j for help,
and j would suggest (min(x, |Rj |)− 2) members of his research team Rj , who have most similar interest
to i, to cooperate with i. Such behavior can be viewed as kin selection, and is featured in certainty.
When finishing the work is beyond the ability of the team Rj , the researcher i would ask for external
helpers. Uncertainty exists in this selection behavior, which inspires the design of randomly choosing
(x − min(x, |Rj |) players outside of Rj to cooperate. The uncertainty shorts the average shortest path
length of modelled networks. Note that a researcher could belong to several research teams, hence above
scene would happen in each team.
Based on above set-up, we build the hypergraph model as follows:
1. Reputation assignment
For time t = 1, ..., T ∈ Z+ do:
Sprinkle nodes Nt as new players uniformly and randomly on S
1. Select subset N lt from Nt
randomly as lead nodes, and value the reputation of j(θj , tj) ∈ N lt as r(j) = αt−βj tβ−1.
62. Cooperation rule
For time t = 1, ..., T do:
For each new node i(θi, ti) ∈ Nt, select a lead node set M li for which ∀j(θj , tj) ∈ M li satisfies
r(j) > pi− |pi− |θi − θj || and tj < ti. For each j ∈M li , add i to j’s research team Rj , and generate
a hyperedge at probability p by grouping i, j, (min(x, |Rj |) − 2) players of Rj nearest to i, and
(x−min(x, |Rj |)) players 6∈ Rj randomly, where x is the random variable above defined.
The player set of the model N =
⋃T
t=1Nt, and the number of players n = |N | =
∑T
t=1 |Nt|. Here we
let |Nt| and |N lt | be constants over t. Compare with the model in Ref. [38], the new model reduces the
number of parameters. Moreover, the new model has the ability to reproduce the empirical feature of
the distribution of hyperdegrees, and that of paper team sizes. A node’s hyperdegree is the number of
hyperedges that contain the node.
The data
To test the fitting ability of the proposed model, we analyze two empirical coauthorship networks (Ta-
ble 1). Dataset PNAS is composed of 52,803 papers published in Proceedings of the National Academy
of Sciences during 1999–2013. Dataset PRE comprises 24,079 papers published in Physical Review E
during 2007-2016. Note that 43,304 papers of the first dataset belong to biological sciences, and the
second dataset comes from physical sciences. The different collaboration level (reflected by the average
number of authors per paper) of the two datasets (PNAS 6.028, PRE 3.102) helps to test the flexibility
of the model.
In the process of extracting networks from those metadata, authors are identified by their names on
their papers. For example, the author named “Carlo M. Croce” on his paper is represented by the name.
We mainly focus on the distribution of degree and that of hyperdegree as well as some properties based
on degrees. From the analysis of Ref. [39], we find that identifying authors by their name on papers
holds the degree distribution feature of ground truth data, which partially verifies the reliability of the
empirical networks used here.
Using surname and the initial of the first given name generates a lot of merging errors of name
disambiguation [40]. Hence we compute the proportion of those authors, and that of those authors
7further conditioned on publishing more than one paper. Meanwhile, Chinese names were also found to
account for the repetition of names [39]. We count the proportion of names with a given name less than
six characters and a surname among major 100 Chinese surnames. The small proportions of such authors
and those of such authors publishing more than one paper (Table 1) limit the impact of name repetition,
especially for dataset PNAS.
Table 1. Specific statistical indexes of the empirical data.
Data a b c d
PNAS 2.62% 1.08% 2.90% 0.27%
PRE 3.85% 1.58% 19.2% 6.45%
Indexes a and b are the percent of authors who have a surname among major 100 Chinese surnames
and only one given name shorter than six characters, and the percent of those authors further
conditioned on publishing more than one papers respectively. Indexes c and d are the percent of authors
who use surname and the initial of the first given name, and the percent of those authors further
conditioned on publishing more than one papers respectively.
To reproduce specific features of the empirical data, we choose proper parameters (Table 2) to generate
two hypergraphs, and extract simple graphs from them (where edges are formed between every two nodes
in each hyperedge, isolated nodes are ignored, and multiple edges are viewed as one). Since the model is
stochastic, we generate 20 networks with the same parameters, and compare their statistical indicators
in Table 3. The finding is that the model is robust on those indicators (Table 4).
Table 2. The parameters of Synthetic-1, -2.
T = 5, 000, 6, 000 N1 = 100, 15 N2 = 5, 5 p = 0.25, 0.4
α = 0.13, 0.2 β = 0.52, 0.55 γ = 4.2, 4.2 µ = 6, 2 ν = 42, 6
The parameters in the first row control network size, and those in the second row control a range of
distributions, such as degree distribution, hyperdegree distribution, etc.
Cooperation cost and reputation benefit
Based on the cost and the benefit of collaborations, we explain the distribution feature of paper team
sizes. The benefit of joining a paper team is limited. The law of diminishing marginal utility holds in
academic society. The allocation of academic achievements is often according to author order. Hence
only the researchers with positive benefit-minus-cost would join the paper team. Assume the number of
8Table 3. Specific statistical indexes of the analyzed networks.
Network NN NE GCC AC AP MO PG
PNAS 201,748 1,225,176 0.881 0.230 6.422 0.884 0.868
Synthetic-1 128,749 694,769 0.864 0.229 11.35 0.987 0.648
PRE 37,528 90,711 0.838 0.394 6.060 0.950 0.583
Synthetic-2 29,397 62,834 0.829 0.174 12.91 0.983 0.505
The indexes are the numbers of nodes (NN) and edges (NE), global clustering coefficient (GCC),
assortativity coefficient (AC), average shortest path length (AP), modularity (MO), and the node
proportion of the giant component (PG). The values of AP of the first two networks are calculated by
sampling 300,000 pairs of nodes.
Table 4. The means and standard deviations (SDs) of specific indexes.
Synthetic-1 NN NE AC GCC PG MO AP
Mean 1.29E+05 6.23E+04 2.45E−01 8.64E−01 6.53E−01 9.87E−01 1.12E+01
SD 7.66E+02 1.14E+04 3.45E−02 7.08E−04 8.03E−03 4.97E−04 1.47E−01
Synthetic-2
Mean 2.93E+04 6.23E+04 1.35E−01 8.30E−01 5.06E−01 9.82E−01 1.22E+01
SD 1.48E+02 5.89E+02 2.93E−02 6.13E−04 6.48E−03 6.18E−04 5.33E−01
The meanings of headers are shown in the notes of Table 3.
those researchers is nr. Meanwhile, the joining behaviour has certain degrees of randomness. Let the
joining probability be p. Then the paper team size will follow a binomial distribution, and so a Poisson
distribution with expected value nrp approximately (Poisson limit theorem). Due to the law of dimin-
ishing marginal utility, the sizes of those papers would follow a generalized Poisson distribution, because
this distribution describes situations where the occurrence probability of an event involves memory [41].
Some important works require many researchers (even from different research teams) work together,
which would bring about huge economic and social benefits. The papers of those works would have many
authors, and sometimes show their appearances in specific famous journals, e. g. a paper in Nature has
2,832 authors (see Fig. 3 in Ref. [34]). In fact, signing on a paper of a famous journal will also bring about
a huge benefit. The existence of those papers leads to fat tails emerging paper team size distributions.
In brief, above analysis makes us think that benefit-minus-cost and the randomness of joining be-
haviour make a paper team size follow a generalized Poisson distribution, and huge expected benefits
lead to fat-tail. There exists a cross-over between the two limits (Fig. 2). The fitting function of the
distribution, including following discussed distribution of hyperdegree and that of degree, is a combina-
tion of a generalized Poisson distribution and a power-law function (Table 5). We perform a two-sample
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Figure 2. The distributions of sizes per paper team. In the panels of the first two columns, the
regions “G-P”, “C-O”, “P-L” stand for generalized Poisson, cross-over and power-law respectively. The
parameters and goodness of fittings are listed in Table 5.
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test to compare the distributions of two data vectors: indexes (e. g. paper
team sizes), the samples drawn from the corresponding fitting distribution. The null hypothesis is that
the two data vectors are from the same distribution. The p-value of each fitting shows the test cannot
reject the null hypothesis at the 5% significance level.
In the model, with a proper upper bound parameter µ (around average number of authors per paper of
corresponding empirical data), the model can reproduce the generalized Poisson part of the distribution
of paper team sizes, because most of modelled paper team sizes are drawn from Poisson distribution
with an expected value around µ. Meanwhile, with a proper lower bound parameter ν, the mechanism
can generate a few significantly large paper team sizes, and so the fat tails of the modelled paper team
size distributions. We choose ν through iteration from the starting point of the power-law part in the
corresponding empirical distribution of paper team sizes (E in Table 5) until the modelled networks have
the similar feature of the empirical distribution of degrees and that of paper team sizes.
Now we turn to explain the distribution feature of degrees. Substantial authors publish only one paper
(PNAS: 64.8%, PRE: 63.9%), and most of paper team sizes draw from a generated Poisson distribution
(PNAS: 99.9%, PRE: 99.9%). Those lead the generalized Poisson parts of degree distributions. Note that
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Table 5. The parameters and goodness of fitting functions for degree distribution,
hyperdegree distribution, and the distribution of paper team sizes, from the top down.
a b c d s B E p-value
4.751 0.434 110.8 2.987 0.845 10 25 0.256
PNAS 0.085 0.367 2.368 2.941 11.99 3 7 0.128
3.438 0.382 3,094 4.755 1.095 16 17 0.174
5.082 0.380 708.4 3.580 0.898 13 32 0.074
Synthetic-1 0.664 0.365 16.15 3.694 1.999 4 9 0.971
4.502 0.208 3,621 5.059 1.003 6 20 0.103
2.776 0.156 8.910 2.758 0.898 5 6 0.118
PRE 0.038 0.399 4.260 3.079 25.56 3 10 0.875
2.507 0.000 82.66 4.587 1.249 6 7 0.133
2.352 0.2367 46.65 3.460 0.970 5 11 0.052
Synthetic-2 0.375 0.272 1.786 2.991 3.077 5 6 0.673
2.007 0.065 116.1 4.756 1.146 5 7 0.887
The domains of generalized Poisson f1(x) = a(a+ bx)
x−1e−a−bx/x! , cross-over and power-law
f2(x) = cx
−d are [min(x), E], [B,E] and [B,max(x)] respectively. The fitting function defined on
[min(x),max(x)] is f(x) = q(x)sf1(x) + (1− q(x))f2(x), where q(x) = e−(x−B)/(E−x). The fitting
processes are: Calculate parameters of sf1(x) and f2(x) by regressing the head and tail of empirical
distribution respectively; Find B and E through exhaustion to make f(x) pass KS test (p-value> 0.05).
The p-value measures the goodness-of-fit.
the boundaries of generated Poisson parts of paper team size distributions are 41 and 20 for PNAS and
PRE respectively, which are detected by the boundary point detection algorithm for probability density
functions in Ref. [38] (listed in Appendix).
With the growing of their papers, a few authors experience the cumulative process of collaborators
over time, whose reputations also increase. As empirical data show, it is an accelerative process, which is
often explained by cumulative advantage. The process reflects as the transition from a generated Poisson
to a power-law (Fig. 3). Above explanation can also be used to explain the similar feature of hyperdegree
distributions. Note that the nodes of large paper teams also have a large degree, which reflects as the
outliers in the tails of degree distributions.
In the model, we can choose suitable parameters α, |Nt|, |N lt | and p to make the hyperdegrees
of substantial players be one (Synthetic-1: 48.5%, Synthetic-2: 61.5%). Meanwhile, the substantial
modelled paper team sizes follow a generalized Poisson distribution (Synthetic-1: 99.9%, Synthetic-2:
100%). Those yield the generalized Poisson part of modelled degree distributions. The boundary of
generalized Poisson part is 34 for Synthetic-1 and 23 for Synthetic-2. The mechanism of generating
hyperedges makes only early lead nodes and specific players close to them can experience the cumulative
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Figure 3. The empirical and synthetic distributions of collaborators/papers per author.
The regions “G-P”, “C-O”, “P-L” stand for generalized Poisson, cross-over and power-law respectively.
The parameters and goodness of fittings are listed in Table 5.
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process of connecting new players. The cumulative process generates the fat tails of modelled degree
distributions, as well as those of modelled hyperdegree distributions (Fig. 3). The cumulative speed and
so the power law exponent can be tuned by parameter β.
Spatial reciprocity and network reputation
Cooperation needs to be based on acquaintanceship. Hence there is an acquaintanceship network under
each coauthorship network. Geographic contexts (such as organization, institution, etc.) contribute to
emerging clustering structure in acquaintanceship network, namely “the friend of my friend is also my
friend” [16]. The Internet extends the scope of acquaintanceship, which crosses spatial barriers even
national boundaries. Therefore, the factor of clustering changes from geography to interest, namely
“birds of a feather flock together” [42].
Cooperation costs make cooperators should have similar research interests, namely collaborations exist
in researcher clusters formed by similar interests. Hence the spatial reciprocity principle in cooperative
game theory [31] needs to be modified by interest in the situation of academic cooperation. In a network
perspective, the extent of spatial reciprocity can be reflected by local clustering coefficient and the degree
difference between a node and its neighbors.
Now we discuss the relationship between spatial reciprocity and network reputation. In the view
of nodes, network reputation can be reflected by degree. Hence the relationship can be reflected by
two functions of degree, namely the average local clustering coefficient of k-degree nodes C(k), and the
average degree of k-degree nodes’ neighbors N(k). There is a transition in each of the functions (Fig. 4).
The tipping points of C(k) and N(k) are detected by the boundary point detection algorithm for general
functions in Ref. [38] (listed in Appendix). Inputs of the algorithm are C(k)/N(k), g(·) = log(·) and
h(s) = a1e
−((s−a2)/a3)2/h(s) = a1s3 +a2s2 +a3s+a4 (s, ai ∈ R, i = 1, ..., 4). Using those inputs is based
on the observation of C(k) and N(k).
Coauthorship networks are found to have two features: high clustering (a high probability of a nodes
two neighbors connecting) and degree assortativity (a positive correlation coefficient between two random
variables: a node’s degree and the average degree of the node’s neighbors), which are measured by GCC
and AC in Table 3 respectively. To understand the essence of high clustering, degree assortativity, as well
as the transitions in C(k) and N(k), we analyze the feature of the basic context of collaborations, i. e.
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Figure 4. The relation between degree and average degree of neighbors, and that between
local clustering coefficient and degree. The panels show k-degree nodes’ average degree of their
neighbors and their the average local clustering coefficient respectively.
14
research teams. Given the cost and benefit of joining a research team, only the researchers with positive
benefit-minus-cost would join the team with a probability (that would be affected by previous members
due to gossips, etc.). With an argument similar to the one used in the distribution of paper team sizes,
we can assume the research team sizes follow a generalized Poisson distribution. A few research teams
with a huge reputation would attract substantial collaborators and become significantly large ones.
Based on the above analysis, we can think that small degree authors comprises two parts: one is
composed of the authors of small research teams, and other one comprises the unproductive authors
belonging to small paper teams and to large research teams. Researchers in the small research team
probably write a paper together, which causes they have a high local clustering coefficient, and a slight
degree difference between them and their neighbors. Many authors in large research teams only write
one paper, and the paper team only contains a few leaders. Hence those authors would have a relatively
high local clustering coefficient, and a relatively small difference between their degree and the average
degree of their neighbors. From above analysis, we can infer small degree authors contribute to degree
assortativity and high clustering of coauthorship networks, which fits the empirical data (Figs. 4).
The collaborators of some productive authors may not coauthor, and some productive authors often
have many collaborators. The degree difference emerges between those authors and their neighbors, on
average. Hence we can infer those large degree authors negatively contribute to degree assortativity and
high clustering. The inference fits the empirical data: the tails of C(k) and N(k) of each empirical
network emerge a different trend from the heads (Figs. 4). Note that the authors of large paper teams
also have a large degree, but contribute to degree assortativity and high clustering. The existence of
those authors causes the scattered points of the tails of C(k) and N(k).
The model can generate research teams with a size distribution as above inferred. Due to the
power function of reputation, the expected size Eλ(T ) of a research team of lead i is proportional to∑T
s=ti+1
αt−βi s
β−1 ≈ α(T/ti)β for T  ti. This yields P (Eλ(T ) < κ) = P (ti > (α/κ)1/βT ). With an
argument similar for the reasonability of reputation function, we can obtain the tail of the distribution of
modelled research team sizes P (κ) = ∂P (Eλi(T ) < κ)/∂κ ∝ 1/κ1+1/β . When T 6 ti, the research team
size λ is drawn from a Poisson distribution with an expected value proper to α(T/ti)
β due to the Poisson
point process of generating nodes. Hence the small modelled research team sizes are drawn from a range
of Poisson distributions with expected values taking from a power function. With proper parameters,
those can be used as basis to fit a given generalized Poisson distribution.
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Most modelled hyperedges are generated by grouping a small fraction (around µ) of nodes close in
space, which expresses the spatial reciprocity principle. Moreover, to fit empirical hyperdegree distri-
butions, we choose specific parameters make a large fraction of nodes only belong to one hyperedge.
Meanwhile, most modelled hyperedges contain one lead node, and only early lead nodes and a few nodes
close to them can be persistently contained by new hyperedges. Those yield that the small/large degree
nodes contribute positively/negatively to degree assortativity and high clustering. Hence the model well
reproduces the transitions. In addition, the tails of C(k) proportional to 1/k also holds in modelled
networks. For a lead node i, the probability of its new team member coauthor with the formers is
P =
∫
αµtβi /t
βdt ∝ tβi ∝ 1/ki, where ki is the degree of node i.
Discussions and conclusions
Five typical mechanisms of cooperation evolution hold for academic collaborations, which inspires us
to explore game mechanisms in the evolution of coauthorship networks. We define a cooperative game
model on a circle, and reveal how the costs and benefits of individuals generate a range of statistical
and topological features of coauthorship networks, such as fat-tail, small-world, etc. It overcomes the
weakness of the model in Ref. [27], a lot of parameters, and has the new ability to fit the distribution of
paper team sizes and that of hyperdegree. Moreover, it has the potential to illuminate specific views and
implications in the broader study of cooperative behaviors as follows.
Do there exist innate rules behind the social complexity? It provides an example of how individual
strategies based on maximizing benefit-minus-cost and on specific randomness generate the complexity
emerged in coauthorship networks. The general idea of the model potentially bridges cooperative game
theory and specific social networks generated by human strategies, e. g. social affiliation networks.
Does utilitarianism help the development of sciences? The strategy of maximizing benefit-minus-
cost will give rise to flocking to famous research team or to hot fields. Taking such strategy helps to
collect publications and citations, but suppresses diversity, and consequently does harm to the flexibility
of academic environment. However, current academic evaluation methods and funding mechanisms are
mainly oriented by specific indexes, e. g. the number of citations. Specific regulations could be simulated
through the model to work out a way to maintain the balance in academic environment, while encouraging
breakthroughs in key fields.
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Appendix
Detecting boundary points.
The following boundary detection algorithms come from Ref. [38].
Table 6. A boundary detection algorithm for probability density functions.
Input: Observations Ds, s = 1, ..., n, rescaling function g(·), and fitting model h(·).
For k from 1 to max(D1, ..., Dn) do:
Fit h(·) to the PDF h0(·) of {Ds, s = 1, ..., n|Ds ≤ k} by maximum-likelihood
estimation;
Do KS test for two data g(h(t)) and g(h0(t)), t = 1, ..., k
with the null hypothesis they coming from the same continuous distribution;
Break if the test rejects the null hypothesis at significance level 5%.
Output: The current k as the boundary point.
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Table 7. Boundary point detection algorithm for general functions.
Input: Data vector h0(s), s = 1, ...,K, rescaling funtion g(·), and fitting model h(·).
For k from 1 to K do:
Fit h(·) to h0(s), s = 1, ..., k by regression;
Do KS test for two data vectors g(h(s)) and g(h0(s)), s = 1, ..., k with the null
hypothesis they coming from the same continuous distribution;
Break if the test rejects the null hypothesis at significance level 5%.
Output: The current k as the boundary point.
